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III.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(d) and
rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

appellant's Motion for Continuance?

The trial court's denial of

homeowner's Motion for Continuance will not be upset absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion.

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414

(Utah 1990) .
II.

Did the trial court's statements to the defendant regarding

Rule 11 and Rule 26(g) sanctions prevent a fair trial?

The

conduct and remarks of the trial judge will be grounds for a new
trial only where it can be shown that such remarks and conduct
prevented a fair trial.

Bunnell v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 740

P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987).
III.

Did the trial court refuse to admit evidence offered by the

defendant?

This court will presume a judgment or ruling is valid

and supported by the evidence where issues raised on appeal are
not part of the trial record.

Horton v. Gem State Mutual of

Utah, 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990).
IV.

Were the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law regarding the termination of the contract proper?

Findings

of fact will be reversed only if clearly erroneous; conclusion of
law will be reviewed for correctness.

Kasco Services Corporation

v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992).
V.

Do the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law accurately

reflect the trial court's findings?
VI.

Should U.R.A.P. 33 sanctions be imposed on the appellant for
4

the bringing of his non-meritorious appeal issues?

Party will be

subject to sanction under Rule 33 (U.R.A.P.) where the court
finds the appeal was filed in bad faith, was frivolous, or has no
reasonable likelihood of success.

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414

(Utah 1990) .
VII.

Should U.R.A.P. 40(a) sanctions be imposed on the appellant

and his attorney for his failure to adhere to the rules of this
Court?

If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation

of court rules, or is filed without reasonable inquiry into the
law and the facts, sanctions are appropriate.

U.R.A.P. 40(a).

V.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES ANI)
RULES

The following rules are applicable to the issues on appeal:
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions.
...The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
...If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.
Rule 26(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
5

Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections.
... The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a
certification that he has read the request, response, or
objection and that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation; and (3)not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or
expensive, given the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation. ...If a certification is made in violation
of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the
certification, the party on whose behalf the request,
response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation,
including a reasonable attorney fee.
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such
postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the
materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained and
shall show that due diligence has been used to procure it.
The court may also require the party seeking the continuance
to state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he
expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon admits
that such evidence would be given, and that it may be
considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and
excluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon
that ground.
Rule 4-502(5), Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery
proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery
proceedings shall be completed, including all responses
thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with
the court no later than thirty (30) days before the date set
for trial of the case. The tight to conduct discovery with
thirty (30) days before trial shall be within the discretion
of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty
(30) days before trial shall be presented to the judge
assigned to the case upon notice to the other parties in the
6

action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall take
into consideration the necessity and reasons for such
discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of the parties
seeking such discovery, whether permitting such discovery
will prevent the case from going to trial on the scheduled
date, or result in prejudice to any party. Nothing herein
shall preclude or limit the voluntary exchange of
information or discovery by stipulation of the parties at
any time prior to the date set for trial, but in no even
shall such exchanges or stipulations require a court to
grant a continuance of the trial date.
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding
or conclusion.
Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the
evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or
if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best
available means, including recollection. The statement
shall be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or
proposed amendments within 10 days after service. The
statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be
submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval
and, as settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk
of the trial court in the record on appeal.
Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Correction or modification of the record. If any difference
arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be
submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either
party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is
misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or
the appellate court, either before or after the record is
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be
corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be
certified and transmitted. The moving party, or the court
if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the
parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days
after service, any party may serve objections to the
7

proposed changes. All other question as to the form and
content of the record shall be presented to the appellate
court.
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
(a)Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages,
which may include single or double costs, as define din Rule
34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the
party or the party's attorney.
(b)Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper.
Rule 40(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and
other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active
member in good standing of the Bar of this state. The
attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his
or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State
Bar number. A party who is not represented by and attorney
shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper and state the
party's address and telephone number. Except when other
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions,
briefs, and other papers need not be verified or accompanied
by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has
read the motion, brief or other paper; that to the best of
his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for
the purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion,
brief, or other papers not signed as required by this rule,
it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the attorney or other
party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the authority and the procedures of
the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply.
8

VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/appellee (Hereinafter "the designer") entered into a
personal services contract with defendant/appellant (Hereinafter
"the homeowner") to perform interior design work and consultation
homeowners' Deer Valley home.

The oral agreement between the

parties was reduced to writing by the homeowner, and was prepared
in its entirety by the homeowner.

Homeowner agreed to pay the

designer a total design fee in the amount of $8,000.00.

That fee

was to be paid in quarterly payments of $2,000.00 each over the
course of one year.

The term of the agreement began July 1, 1991

and ended June 30, 1992. At the end of the term of the agreement
homeowner had paid only $6,000.00 of the total amount due, and
had also failed and refused to pay Utah State sales tax, in the
amount of $1,925.00.

The homeowner refused to pay the remaining

amount and attempted to unilaterally terminate the contract after
the designer had completed her work under the contract.

On

August 18, 1992, designer filed her Complaint with the trial
court.

Designer complained, among other things, that she had

substantially performed her part of the agreement and that the
remaining $2,000.00, plus the additional amounts of Utah State
Sales tax was due and owing.
Homeowner filed his Answer and Counterclaim on September 11,
1992.

Homeowner was sent designer's Request for Trial Date on

January 5, 1993.

The trial court sent the Notice of Trial Date
9

on January 12, 1993.

Trial was scheduled for February 10, 1993.

Homeowner filed his Motion for Continuance and various Discovery
Requests, including his request to depose designer, on January
15, 1993.

The trial court heard the homeowner's motions and

requests to take depositions on January 27, 1993.
The trial court granted homeowner's request to take the
deposition of the designer, and the deposition was scheduled to
take place on February 5, 1993.

Because of designer's stated

concern that the homeowner was attempting to drive up the cost of
litigation, the trial court warned the homeowner that if the
depositions proved to be a bad faith effort to increase the cost
of litigation, and imposed merely for the purposes of harassment
and delay, then the costs of those depositions, in accord with
the provisions of Rule

11 and 26(g) (U.R.C.P.), could be the

responsibility of the homeowner.

The trial court reserved

consideration and ruling on the issue until the time of trial.
The trial court denied the homeowner's Motion for Continuance.
The trial court granted all of homeowner's Discovery
requests and ordered that all documents, admissions and other
information requested be provided to the homeowner not later than
February 3, 1993.

All requested matters were produced by the

designer on or before February 3, 1993.

The deposition scheduled

for February 5, 1993 was then cancelled by the homeowner.
The trial was held on February 10, 1993.

During the Trial,

the homeowner conceded to the trial court that he owed the Utah
State sales tax as alleged by the designer, and the homeowner
10

paid the sales tax to the designer.
recess was taken.

During the proceedings, a

When the court again resumed the proceedings,

the tape recorder failed to record the proceedings.

When the

tape starts again, it begins in progress with a witness who is
identified as Susan St.James, wife of the homeowner.
The trial court found that the designer had substantially
performed her obligations under the agreement and entered
judgment in favor of the designer.

VII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
HOMEOWNER'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE.
Homeowner was given more than adequate time to prepare his
defense and to take discovery.
abuse of discretion.
was harmless error.

The homeowner cannot show an

The denial of the Motion for Continuance
This issue is without merit or likelihood of

success.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENTS TO THE HOMEOWNER REGARDING RULE

11 SANCTIONS DID NOT PREVENT A FAIR TRIAL.
The trial court was attempting to educate the pro se
defendant regarding the Rules of Civil Procedure.

A pro se

defendant is, nevertheless, held to the same standard of conduct
as one who is licensed to practice law.

No objection was raised

to the remarks and conduct of the trial judge and is therefore
barred as being raised for the first time on appeal.
11

III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY

THE DEFENDANT.
The homeowner attempts to unilaterally supplement the
record, and introduce evidence that is not part of the record on
appeal.

This is in clear violation of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure regarding record supplementation.

Because

the homeowner has not complied with Rule 11 (U.R.A.P.), this
Court must presume the trial court's decision was correct, valid
and, supported by the evidence.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

WERE PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Homeowner's statement of the standard of review is
incorrect.

The purported evidence supporting homeowner's

argument is barred from consideration by virtue of the U.R.A.P.
11 violation cited above.

The trial court's findings of fact are

supported by the clear weight of the evidence and there is no
indication from the record that the trial judge failed to
adequately deliberate and consider the merits of the case.
Automatic Control Products v. Tel-Tech, 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah
1989).

Designer substantially performed under the agreement and

is entitled to judgment.
V.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ACCURATELY

REFLECT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
The trial court's findings and conclusions are accurately
reflected in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
12

VI,

U.R.A.P. 33 SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON HOMEOWNER FOR THE

BRINGING OF A NON-MERITORIOUS, BAD FAITH APPEAL,
Homeowner has pursued this appeal even though it has no
reasonable likelihood of success; has displayed a pattern of
dilatory practices, which has unreasonably increased the cost of
this appeal; has failed to exercise reasonable inquiry when
stating questions of law and standards of review before this
Court; and has failed to comply with the clear requirements of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically with respect to
the attempt to unilaterally supplement the record.

Rule 33

Sanctions are therefore appropriate.

VII,

U.R.A.P. 40(a) SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE HOMEOWNER

AND HIS ATTORNEY FOR HIS REPEATED FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE RULES
OF THIS COURT.
Homeowner's counsel mischaracterizes the proceedings below,
misstates basic questions of law, attaches unrelated authority,
and has submitted to this court matters and evidence which are
not part of the official record.

The designer in each case has

been required to respond to homeowner's violation or noncompliance with this Court's Rules of Procedure.

Rule 40(a)

Sanctions are therefore appropriate.
VIII.
ARGUMENT
I.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
HOMEOWNER'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE.
13

The Homeowner is required to show an abuse of discretion to
sustain any merits of his continuance argument on appeal.

Hill

v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992), citing Christenson
v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988) and Hardv v. Hardy,
776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989).
Homeowner's stated reason for urging the continuance of the
trial date was for the furtherance of discovery.
of Hearing,

January 27, 1993, p. 2.

See

Transcript

Prior to his discovery

requests of January 15, 1993, the homeowner had performed no
discovery.

The trial court ordered that all discovery requests

made by the homeowner were to be complied with, no later than
February 3rd, 1993.
1993,p.20.

See Transcript

of Hearing,

January 27,

All discovery as requested by the homeowner were

supplied on or before February 3, 1993. All depositions as
requested by the homeowner were actually scheduled and were to be
conducted on February 5, 1993.

See Transcript

of

Hearing,

January 27, 1993, p. 20. The homeowner, after receipt of
discovery information from the designer, declined to conduct the
depositions.
At the hearing on January 27, 1993, the court also offered
to continue the trial date to February 17, 1993, but the
homeowner declined that date.

See Transcript

of Hearing,

January

27, 1993, p. 18. Homeowner had over five months for depositions
and discovery to be undertaken.

It is undisputed that homeowner,

during that five-month period of time, undertook no formal
discovery.

Homeowner waited until three weeks before the
14

scheduled trial to begin this process by filing requests for
discovery and depositions on January 15, 1993.

The homeowner

complains that the trial court's denial of his Motion for
Continuance was unreasonable.

The homeowner then fails to show

even one instance where he was unable to fairly present his case
because of the denial of the Motion for Continuance.

This case

is a basic collection matter, based upon a written agreement
prepared in its entirety by the homeowner.

The evidence

presented at trial by both parties consisted of documents and
statements that were entirely known to both parties.
The homeowner makes no attempt to show how the denial of his
Motion for Continuance prevented him from obtaining a fair trial.
Other than the bald assertion that he did not have time to
prepare, the homeowner does not even suggest how the trial
court's denial precluded him from fairly presenting his case.
Ample time was allowed after the commencement of the lawsuit
to utilize discovery procedures.

It is well established law that

a trial court is vested with substantial discretion in deciding
whether requests for continuance should be granted.

It is also

firmly established that the trial courts decision will not be
reversed unless it is clear that the trial court has abused that
discretion by acting unreasonably.

U.R.C.P. 40(b);Hunt v. Hurst,

785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990); Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375,
1377 (Utah 1988); Hill v. Dickerson,839 P.2d 309 (Utah App.
1992).

In Hunt, a pro se party's motion for continuance was

denied where the pro se party had five months for discovery,
15
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Ail discovery requested by

* i J.II » <,tt , nH
See Transcript

H I requests
of

Hearing,

January 27, 1993, p.17-20.

The homeowners claims are obviously

frivolous and without merit.
The trial court offered homeowner its best choices in trial
dates available to the court, within the time and resource
constraints then affecting the trial court.
Hearing,

Transcript

of

January 27, 1993, p. 21. To assign error to the trial

court for homeowner's choice is illogical.
of the homeowner was his choice.

The travel schedule

The homeowner now contends that

his choices about that travel schedule should be error assigned
to the trial court.

The trial court scheduled the trial date

approximately six months from the date after the Complaint was
filed.

The homeowner, by his own statement, was available for

that trial date, and could not attend a later date because of his
travel schedule.

The homeowner must accept responsibility for

his scheduling choice.

See Transcript

of Hearing,

January 27,

1993, ppl8-21.
Finally, the homeowner claims that a substantial right was
affected when the trial court denied his Motion for Continuance.
Homeowner offers no reason why the five months prior to trial was
not an ample length of time to prepare his defense.

The only

claim that homeowner forwards on this matter is, that this Court
should upset the trial court's ruling because the trial court
would not accommodate homeowner's travel schedule.
Transcript

of Hearing,

January 27, 1993, ppl8-21.

See
This does not

amount to a showing of an abuse of discretion.
This claim of error is without merit, it has no reasonable
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1 Lkelihood of success and Is entirely tiivoJou.

II.

n

\ Tiar ict^i

T H E TRIAL COIJK i ^ ^rAi'EMENTS TO T H E HOMEOWNER REGARDING R U L a

11 A N D R U L E 26(g) SANCTIONS W E R E REASONABLE A N D PROPER A N D L-iD N O T
PREVENT A FAIR T R I A L .
It Is w e l l estab 11 shed 11 iat 11 Ie pei: n i:I ssI vei iess i Ised for di scovery
p r o c e d u r e s has limitations, 5ir:d Piat these
:-.

•

. iu\± i.at, ions dio^ . J

" - jf tne rules ^f "ivi. Procedure v::ic:

are *

ecure tne just, speedy,

deter minat i o r

,:

e v e n - accicr:. "

J LJ t\~cl '-11.4 i Ul. .ill I''Mi i

-r.^^c. . .

State Road C o m m i s s i o n v. Pettv,

Th'-' M i l l

i-riirt h a s t h e power and

d i s c r e t i o n to Impose sanctions on parties w h o frustrate ttno
• hi eot ive .

Under Ru] r- 1 1 and 2 6(g) II. P , A. P . a party signing

m o t i o n s , documents , ana - .• i_ i i * - t «11 O C U V W L ; requt-;;:" i w i v I I i i \ by that
signature that those requests are interposed in good faith
i v I-i I nidge

The

i in"' present case w a s merely trying to encourage

such an outcome Ly his explanations ot i. Ii^by i u P-, P

P, i L

Procedure to the p r o se defendant.
i in- c'.ipp.n.ipi J 'it i P a r a o r P V PvitPon of the trial court's
statements regarding homeowner ' o decision to d e p o s e I K- dt-^ig.-r
are clear from, the Transcript
See Transcript • 1 'i-?,;ir Jin,

of Hearing
i JJA.I ,

nn January 27, P P .

"'

• »'

,

P

P

P-17

Simply stated, the trial court was attempting to explain lu a iz o
se £ • a 3 : t:y the reqi ii rements of good faith and t h e p o s s i b l e
imposition of Rule 11 and Kile ^ o p

ii

i i

-ITM I inn,^ in ill

p a r t i c i p a n t s In the litigation in the event that t h e court
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WC1K,

convinced of the bad faith of any of the parties.

The court

explained that either party is subject to sanctions, including
costs and attorney's fees, if they act in bad faith toward each
other and needlessly increase the cost of litigation to the
opposing party.

The following language of the Court illustrates

the Court's indulgence of the homeowner, and the court's attempt
to explain the basic legal precept of good faith requirements to
the homeowner:
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to award you
attorney's fees if you didn't incur any, number one.
You've chosen to be pro se. If in the course of a
trial you were to convince me that this action was
brought in bad faith, without any legitimate basis,
that if your costs were — if Mr. Gold required you to
take depositions and do things that were simply a waste
of time and running up costs, then absolutely, I would
consider a motion to award fees back.
But that's not what I have before me. I have a
plaintiff that brought an action. There was no
ostensible reason why a deposition should be taken in
the case. And if that proves to be correct, that there
was no needful, appropriate reason for the deposition,
I'm just telling you you're on the hook for the costs
of those.
If Mr. Gold required something for you to do that
incurred a cost that was not needful, it was merely for
harass, delay, then absolutely you're going to be
looking—you' d be entitled to some sanctions back to
him. The rules apply both ways.
Judge Roger Livingston, Trial Court Judge, Transcript of Hearing,
January 27, 1993, pp. 16-17.
Rule 26(g) (U.R.C.P.) specifically provides that a court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose appropriate
sanction, including reasonable expenses incurred, upon a party
whose discovery certification is made in violation of the rule.
19

Rale

'Abi:^
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1 laxtn and

reasonable inquiry certification apply.
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.Rule JbUj) nii>i huh-

, "F"h'":j homeowner does not

I J i ii. J' '

complain or allege that the statements of the judge ait- in any
1

My incorrect or improper in light: of Rule 26(g),

allegation cannot be made l^

t Jjt-» homeowner

)>WVUM,P

That.
-Tndqe

Livingston's statements are a correct and precise statement of a
rail, ".< respc nsib;i i 11

to induct discovery in good faith.

The homeowner characterizes the issue oL lernar ks and

I'IIINI

:»f the trial judge as that of an exclusive question of law.
1 lj { ; H Ll

- '" ' -1»

I"

l (,-

»5 Mountain Fuel Supply Co.

Corp.,7 52 P.2d 884 (Utah 19SH\

See Appellant

i

To

v. Salt Lake City
*& -----

linkage and attribution of authority in this argumenc defies
logic.

The question present <-d

;. nh. . >f I hf- iippi -rriaoeness of

the remarks and conduct of the trial judge.
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That issue is in no

way related to the decision reached in Mountain Fuel,

Mountain

Fuel establishes a standard of review where questions of law
regarding equal protection are exclusively raised on appeal.

The

homeowner's citation of authority and characterization of the
questions of law presented are clearly inappropriate.
A pro se defendant is held to the same standard of conduct
as one who is licensed to practice law.

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669

p.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983), reaffirmed by Worst v. Department of
Employment Security, 818 p.2d 1036, note 3 (Utah App. 1991).
However, under the doctrine that a lay person acting as his or
her own attorney should be accorded every consideration that may
reasonably be indulged, the trial court, in the present case,
undertook to explain the implications of unnecessarily increasing
the cost of litigation to the designer.

After indulging the pro

se defendant in a lengthy explanation of the rules of the court,
the trial court waived the U.R.C.P. requirement for discovery at
least 3 0 days before trial and granted the homeowner's Motion for
Discovery.

It is impossible for the designer to guess at how

this indulgence by the court "precluded" the homeowner from
taking the requested depositions.
Alternatively, even if the trial court erred in its
explanations of the rules to the homeowner, there was no
objection raised by homeowner to the remarks and conduct of the
trial judge.

This Court will not address an issue raised for the

first time on appeal.

Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lvtle,

806 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah App. 1991).
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See also:

Gaston v. Hunter,

588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App

1 <7"i ">ntJr wn i ^- , In - i i']lil Mi -ippeal

in instance of judicial misconduct if he fails to object at i
time when ctlM-'itM "n i =c^ iMui t

, u| I hp ^iired); First Realty & Inv,

Co . , Inc . v . Fubert, 60 0 P. 2d 114J* (I da no i < ( '•• (

..riei nei i L IJI.

court :^rr"^ rv 'v commented from bencn was n jt preserved f-o
appeal ..* - i remark

:

. i-'~ —

-

' "

hurt's

il-Co Feeds, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank m
i:

^>cw

r^vr-

'.^r--- •" * ^or preserve for appeal issue

oi JUCIIC — CIJL iiiisccnouci ~

__

^*
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""olcani^ anopr" at off-record bench conference, where party did
n o .

>
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11 t i i. M

Homeowner next argues that because pro se defendant
disagreed with the trial court's ruling, that: he thereby served

disagreement does non rise T O tn^ I eve. -. <.u. OJ';C::J.
/ •:*

-

-^Zziir

-' i'M ~ ~ "-• thereon,

. , _ i - 3^ ,

*

Bar son v. Squibb, M 3 2

*

nctid che

standard as follows:
li i order to preserve a contention of error on appeal,
the party claiming the error in admission of evidence
must raise the objection to the trial court in clear
and concise terms and in a timely fashion calculated to
obtain a ruling thereon.

The pro se defendant's disagreements do not u,;»y i u M u s
level of contention so as to allow the trial court to rule.
Transcript

oi Hearing,

Janu.iM

' '- " 'l| - M

'"' " '

' imply

engaging in argument with the trial judge does not calculate an
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opportunity for a ruling.

The issue is therefore barred, as

being raised for the first time on appeal.
This issue of appeal has no reasonable likelihood of
success, is trivial to the disposition of the case, is entirely
frivolous in its nature, and is not based on the facts
surrounding the indulgence of the pro se party by the trial
court.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY
THE HOMEOWNER.
Homeowner admits in his Brief (pl3), and elsewhere (Memo, in

Opposition to Appellees Motion to Strike and for Sanctions,
January 21, 1994), that there is no record of the trial court
excluding any evidence where homeowner purportedly attempted to
introduce documentary evidence.

The homeowner then attempts to

supplement the record by attaching a purported exhibit and the
Affidavit of Susan St. James.

Appendix

F & G, Appellant

's

Brief.

Homeowner's attempt to unilaterally supplement the record in
this manner is patently improper and must be disregarded because
homeowner has failed to comply with

Rule 11(g)&(h)U.R.A.P..

claim is therefore fatally deficient under
U.R.A.P.

His

Rule 11(e)(2)

The proper method for supplementing the record is for

homeowner to seek a supplementation hearing before the trial
court.

Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah App.

1991) (when record appropriately needs supplementation, Rule
11(h) is method to be implemented).

This Court has further

announced its view on claims of error submitted outside the scope
23

ot U. R.A.I , 1.1 !i , ' M ,,„ Hjrton

'. Uern State Mutual of Utah:

Absent the trial transcript, appellant's claim of error
is "merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which
we cannot resolve." Mark VII Fin. Consultants
Co., 792
P.2d at 134. Without all the relevant evidence bearing
on the issues raised on appeal, as required by Utah
R.App.P. 11(E)(2), "we can only presume that the
judgment was supported by sufficient evidence. State
v. Nine "Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine
Dollars
7^1
7 2i r^" 217 (Utah App. 1990),
7 94 P. 2d 847

f fi 1', ,i

•- affidavit and -vidence -attached as appendix to
homeowner's B u e t Jcinm

-.-

... .

I-y Mil, < v>urt.

Olson at

1359-60.
Eecausp I he homeowner has not complied with Rule 11 U.R.A.P.
this Court must presume that Lhe i i J jl

»i" I

k-" i . PHI . i?

correct and valid and that it was supported by the evidence.
State v . Raw i i JI j

^ ^ p ,M 1'"0 (Utah App. 1992) (absent adequate

record, court could nut address issues icutea m i >\> ui i pi^sume
correctness of disposition made by trial court:1
Richins,

' M I , I 1 «L in! ill .'i i

l.son v.

! - i i he Court cf Appeals will

presume that the trial court's findings were supported Ly
competent an* I sufficient evidence, where entire record was not
before Court j ; Smith v. /uicich, b^n i , 2d " •
record before Supreme Court, is incomplete,

M

1 . ir i i '^C i twhere

is unable to review

-::i must therefore presume that verdict was
supported by admissible and competent «;Vidence)f t n ot Federal
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984) dr 'he
absence of -J J e n i 1, -upreme ""-Mirt rrnifit presume that the trial
court's rulings were correct); Sevan v. J.H. Construction .'u..
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Inc., 669 P.2d 441 (Utah 1983) (in the absence of a transcript
Court assumes that the proceedings at trial were regular and
proper and that the judgment was supported by competent and
sufficient evidence).
Any reasonable inquiry into the rules of this Court and, the
fundamental rules of law governing record supplementation, would
have obviated homeowner's argument and designer's cost in
responding.

It is clear that this argument of homeowner is

without merit and has been improperly interposed upon this Court.
Assuming, arguendo,

that this issue is properly before this

court, there can be no showing of error.

The standard of review

related to a trial court's determination of admissibility of
evidence is that the trial court's ruling will not be upset
absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708

(Utah App. 1993) . The record clearly shows that the trial court
openly invited the.homeowner on numerous occasions to submit
further evidence and testimony.
homeowner.

None was forthcoming from the

The Court generously allowed the homeowner free and

full range in submission of evidence and argument.

A finding of

abuse of discretion cannot be supported in this matter.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
WERE PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The standard of review applicable to the issue raised by

homeowner is again different than the standard posited by the
homeowner.

The issue of the contract involves both a question of

fact and a question of law for the purposes of review.
25
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Homeowner first argues that because,
allow his "documentary evidence"

:\ substantial performance

discusser .;. h^ci i

- .at the trial c o u n

erred in its Findings of Fact.
T

- >-liancp upon homeowner's objection to the trial
-

cour*" ^ "reiuodl \^ JU:L . i-_--.•defeating.
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Homeowner * s on ly cont ent ion

with the Findings of Fact is summarily whisked away when ii^ n
lonaer has the purported "non-admission of documentary evidence"
io complain ot . lie c inn<.»l pui:-.Uf his < "b

•

m in l his GVurt ,

because it is simply not part of the record as required m Rul-1
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Al J relevant aspects cr m e (MIKJ-UJI
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e,

consideration, performance, etc.) were explored by the trial
court thr^uqln I <j I m m o

J11I* J u • I exhibits and extensive

colloqu^ between the court and the witnesses. See Transaipt:
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of

Trial,

pp. 1-91.
Homeowner now questions the trial court's findings and cites

Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988), as
authoritative.

Of course, the standard of review cited in Baker

applies where the court interprets a contract as a matter of law
without regard for extrinsic evidence.

It cannot be seriously

argued that the trial court in the present case did not have a
deep and probing regard for extrinsic evidence related to the
contract.

This much is patently clear from the entire record.

The trial court in this matter admitted and allowed evidence
which

went far beyond the "four corners" of the August 14, 1991

agreement.

See Trial

Transcript,

February 5, 1993, pp30-66.

That evidence is extrinsic in nature.

The standard of review

urged by the homeowner does not address the existence of such
extrinsic evidence.
Homeowner's only objection to the Findings of Fact
deals with Paragraph 9 of the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

See Discussion

Conclusions

March 17, 1993, p. 14 (hereinafter

of Law,

"Discussion").

of Findings

of Fact

and

Paragraph 9 reads as follows:

9. The contract between plaintiff and defendant
provided that plaintiff would be paid a design fee in
the amount of $8,000.00 for her services, and that said
design fee would be paid by way of $2,000.00 quarterly
payments with the first payment being due on September
30, 1991.
Findings

of Fact

and Conclusions

of Law, March 17, 1993, p. 3.

The trial court found, by a preponderance of evidence, that
the contract provided for said payment.
27

There is nothing

whatever in the record to suggest that the trial court's finding
is clearly erroneous.

Any claim that the homeowner makes in this

regard is simply his continuing difference of opinion with the
trial court's finding which is adverse to him.
pp. 7, 10-11.

See

Discussion,

The disagreement with the trial court on this

matter does not constitute a meritorious claim of a "clearly
erroneous" finding.

There is ample testimony to justify such a

finding, and the homeowner never has denied that he exclusively
prepared the agreement.
More importantly, the homeowner never objects or questions
the trial court's Finding of Fact, paragraph 12, where the trial
court finds substantial performance on the part of the designer.
The issue of termination on his part is rendered moot by
designer's successful assertion of her "substantial performance"
claim.

Again, the evidence submitted to the court, and the

record provides clear justification for such a finding of
substantial performance by the designer.

The "clearly erroneous"

standard cannot be met.
V.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ACCURATELY
REFLECT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.

The trial court's Findings of Fact will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous. Kasco Services Corporation v.
Benson, op.cit. infra, and where it appears that the trial judge
adequately deliberated and considered the merits of the case in
entering its findings and judgement, Automatic Control Products
v. Tel-Tech,780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989).
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Homeowner ignores the extensive statements of the trial
court on this matter, at the time of trial, and further ignores
the extensive discussion of-the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law which took place before the trial court on March 17, 1993.
The homeowner objected to a number of the Findings of Fact
at the Discussion

on the Findings

of Fact

held on March 17, 1993 ("Discussion").

and Conclusions

of Law

The homeowner apparently

believes that his differences of opinion with the trial court are
grounds for the reversal of the trial court's specific order.
The trial court spent a generous amount of time hearing the
objections of the homeowner on the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

The homeowner would have this Court re-hash

the issue simply because he does not agree that the court knew
what it signed on the 17th of March, 1993.
absurd.

This is patently

If there is any question that the trial court

"mechanically" adopted the designer's proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, it is dispelled by an examination of the
changes made in the final, amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which contain changes that were urged by the
homeowner.

See Discussion,

p2,3,4,5,10,12,13 . The trial court

also made it's position clear during the Discussion:
THE COURT: . . . Again, I guess this is what
trials are for, to sort out contesting perspectives and
different points of view. Again, I tried to do the
best I can for that and so the--and I do believe that
the judgement, the, form and Findings of Fact as I've
directed those be changed, accurately reflect those.
Again, it's not as either of you would have them but I
believe the findings and conclusions and judgement form
is consistent with the ruling of the Court. And I have
no problem with any of that.
29

Discussion, p.15.
The trial court signed the amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law only one hour later.

It is hard to imagine

where the homeowner can find the error he seeks. Assuming,
arguendo,

that homeowner properly defines the question of law,

standard of review, and cites the correct authority, he is still
a long way from proving the Findings are against the "clear
weight of the evidence".
VI.

U.R.A.P. 33 SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON HOMEOWNER FOR THE
BRINGING OF A NON-MERITORIOUS, BAD FAITH APPEAL,
Homeowner has pursued this appeal even though it has no

reasonable likelihood of success, continued to display a pattern
of dilatory practices and has failed to exercise reasonable
inquiry when stating questions of law and standards of review
before this Court.
Designer maintains that the issues brought before this Court
are without merit and are pursued as a dilatory tactic to avoid
final judgment.

Homeowner brings a case to this Court which

cannot be reasonably expected to succeed.
Homeowner has established a pattern of improper docketing
statements, improper submission of documents, failure to adhere
to rules of appellate procedure and a consistent misapplication
or lack of authority in his memoranda.

Designer has been

obligated to respond to four docketing statements, improperly
interposed affidavits and exhibits, numerous procedural missteps
and more than mild deficiencies in presenting his issues on
30

appeal.

Reasonable inquiry into the status of Homeowner's claim,

the rules of this court and the current state of the law
governing homeowner's issues raised on appeal would have
dispensed with such improprieties.
This is precisely the type and kind of case which has been
previously held out by this Court as ripe for Rule 33 Sanctions
and Award of Costs.

Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987);

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990); Utah Deot. of Social
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1987); Mauahan v.
Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989).
VII.

U.R.A.P. 40(a) SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE HOMEOWNER

AND HIS ATTORNEY FOR HIS REPEATED FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE RULES
OF THIS COURT.
Homeowner's counsel mischaracterizes the proceedings below,
misstates basic questions of law, attaches unrelated authority,
and fumbles basic standards of appellate review.

This type of

preparation is indicated by the four different docketing
statements filed in connection with this case.
A great deal of time must be expended in properly re-stating
the questions of law, standards of review and, proceedings in the
lower court.

Additionally, when there are elementary flaws in

the docketing statement, designer is forced to expend inordinate
time and resources to bring these matters to this Court's
attention.
This appeal has previously been dismissed by the Court
because of inadequate Docketing Statements filed by the homeowner
31

and his attorneys.

The designer has previously filed Objections

to homeowner's prior Docketing Statements, and a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, all of which have been previously granted by this
Court.

The homeowner and his current legal counsel have

misrepresented the homeowner's prior representation by a licensed
and active member of the Utah State Bar in order to obtain the
reinstatement of this appeal.

Those misrepresentations have been

verified by affidavits on file with this Court from both the
homeowner's personal secretary and the record keeping personnel
from the Utah State Bar.
Rule 40(a) sanctions are, therefore, appropriate in this
case.

The most recent impropriety in homeowner's conduct is the

attempt to accomplish record supplementation in violation of Rule
ll(g)&(h) and Rule 11(3) (2) (U.R.A.P.).

Even a cursory review of

this Court's Rules of Procedure and the recent case law related
to record supplementation would have resulted in significant
savings of time and expense to designer in responding to this
improper, unmeritorious and frivolous attempt to supplement.
IX.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, homeowner's appeal should
be denied.

The trial court acted properly, within its

discretion, and conducted a fair and impartial hearing and trial.
The designer substantially performed her services under the
agreement and is entitled to the agreed compensation.
The homeowner has brought this appeal to delay final
32

judgment in the order of paying the designer.

It was his intent

from the outset to rob designer of her fee by so increasing the
cost of collection that it grossly exceeded the amount in
controversy.

Additionally, homeowner and his various attorneys

have interposed bad faith arguments, exhibits and other papers on
this court and they should be additionally sanctioned for such
violations of this court's rules.
The judgement of the trial court should be affirmed and this
court should award designer her attorney fees and double costs or.
appeal.

DATED this J

day of February, 1994.
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ADDENDUM A
There are no addendums that appellee wishes to add to her brief.
However, please note that Appellant's Brief contains relevant
materials that are the subject of Appellee's Brief, and a
reproduction here is regarded as wasteful.
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Addendum B

Notice of Appeal

Addendum C

Judgement

Addendum D

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Addendum E

Homeowner's Motion for Continuance

Addendum F

Affidavit of Susan St. James

Addendum G

Excluded Evidence

Discussion of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Addendum H
Law, March 17, 1993
Addendum I:

Transcript of Hearing, January 27, 1993

Addendum J:

Portion of Trial Transcript, February 10, 1993

